The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies [Pdf] AUTHOR Robert M. Citino – sableyes.co.uk



10 thoughts on “The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

  1. says:

    Robert Citino is one of the leading historians of the German Army in the period 1919 1945 although he has extended his sco

  2. says:

    Robert Citi

  3. says:

    At first I'm sorry to say that I don't like North American authors when they speak about European History Lots of them do a very shallow job to understand our way of thinking our cultures even our languages Some of them may be too nationalist in their essays when they speak about a nation with not even 250 years

  4. says:

    Prussian German war machine has always fascinated historians and military buffs alike They were either sweeping the battlefield and winning German wars of unification or putting up so much of a fight that it took a coalition of most powerful states to finally bring them down WW1 WW2Citino asks himself is there a German way of war that makes them such formidable force unlike any other? Is there some secret ingr

  5. says:

    Kurz und vives short and lively If one had to pick a catchphrase to describe the typical fashion in which German armies tended to wage wars this is likely the one you would chose And as author Robert Citino showcases it would be uite apt To be fair the title is a tad of a misnomer we can't even properly call it 'German' warfare until 1871 or at the close of the Franco Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire Rather up u

  6. says:

    To some degree your mileage with this book may vary depending on how much you buy into the ways of war school of thought that argues that various nations have identifiable ways of war on the operational level that can be analyzed and comparedEven if you disagree with that premise Citino's work has much to offer Essentiall

  7. says:

    Citino presents the history of the Prussian Army small surrounded and feudal Geography left Prussia with fewer resources than it's powerful neighbors and meant that if it was to survive as a nation it needed to be

  8. says:

    A fantastic sweeping overview of the PrussianGerman war history of the last 400 years Insightful relating the Prussian historical teachings of techniues and strategies to both modern German war efforts and also Ame

  9. says:

    A little too selective in its choice of battles and ridiculously blinkered in its definition of German

  10. says:

    I'm hit or miss with this particular historian Up front there are parts of this book that unless you are REALLY

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free download Ô eBook or Kindle ePUB ã Robert M. Citino

For Frederick the Great the prescription for warfare was simple kurz und vives short and lively wars that relied upon swift powerful and decisive military operations Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out. At first I m sorry to say that I don t like North American authors when they speak about European History Lots of them do a very shallow job to understand our way of thinking our cultures even our languages Some of them may be too nationalist in their essays when they speak about a nation with not even 250 years of historyBUT Citino is probably the best N American military author I have ever will probably read His way of writing is very humble he knows the german language and does a great job trying to emphasize the prussian way of thinking in the middle of a battlefieldHe criticize mainstream authors about WWII and advocates for an in depth study of historical events in the past to do an interpretation of the today s realityHistorians should think why events happened instead of what they should have done ibd I absolutely love him his writing is great and even funny sometimes with great jokesCongratulations Citino this composition is a true virtue of honesty objectivity and truth From an european this book is golden thank you The 7 Components of Transformative Organizing Theory relied upon swift powerful and decisive military operations Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out. At first I m sorry to say that I don t like North American authors when they speak about European History Lots of them do a very shallow job to understand our way of thinking our cultures even our languages Some of them may be too nationalist in their essays when they speak about a nation with not even 250 years of historyBUT Citino is probably the best N American military author I have ever will probably The Big Golden Book of Poetry read His way of writing is very humble he knows the german language and does a great job trying to emphasize the prussian way of thinking in the middle of a battlefieldHe criticize mainstream authors about WWII and advocates for an in depth study of historical events in the past to do an interpretation of the today s

review The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

The German Way of War From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich Modern War Studies

Time and time again Citino focuses on operational warfare to demonstrate continuity in German military campaigns from the time of Elector Frederick Wilhelm and his great sleigh drive against the Swedes to the age of Adolf Hitler and the blitzkrieg to the gates of Moscow Along the way he undersc. Prussian German war machine has always fascinated historians and military buffs alike They were either sweeping the battlefield and winning German wars of unification or putting up so much of a fight that it took a coalition of most powerful states to finally bring them down WW1 WW2Citino asks himself is there a German way of war that makes them such formidable force unlike any other Is there some secret ingredient that makes German armies so strong He answers yes and identifies 3 key components or principles of German way of war German here means Brandenburg Prussia and unified Germany1 Wars must be short and sharp hit the enemy with full force as soon as possible and win a decissive victory as soon as possible as well because economy and population levels can t sustain long attritional wars against bigger richer states2 Operational and strategic mobility of armies While Citino concentrates on operational level that is moving your army on the battlefield to hit enemy in flanks or rear strategic mobility is important as well as Frederick the Great proved when he moved his armies all over the place3 When in doubt attack Commanders have to be agressive their task is to find enemy and destroy it Commanders have a strong degree of autonomy specially important later when armies became too big to be commanded by a single person and often operated divided into several parts with spotty and slow communication between themCitino then looks at German military history to prove his points Star performer is of course Frederick the Great specially during 7 years war War which ironically was not short violating 1 principle He proves that Frederick acted agressively and used mobility to full extent gaining upper hand Napoleonic wars and wars of german unification are given same tretment pointing out where principles were applied and how it lead to successCitino tries to answer why Germany failed in WW1 answer being agressiveness was lacking at key moments at key points which led to loss of mobility trench warfare and long attritional war which Germany was doomed to loose 1 principleOne could accuse Citino of cherry picking evidence eg Second Silesian war is given only a passing mention however he tries to explain defeats Jena Ausrstadt opening phase of WW1 west as failing to follow the 3 principles My biggest problem is with conclusion mostly two key pointsFirst Citino ends his analysis with German failure at the gates of Moscow in december 1941 On one hand he makes a case that post WW1 German development rested on regaining mobility on strategicoperational level Motorization combined arms doctrine and better communications allowed Germans to advance rapidly outpacing less motorized enemies and unhinge them something with which I agree However failure at Moscow was not a failure of such concept it was problem of distance tenacity of Red Army massive mobilization capability of Soviet Union weather etc However in next 2 years Germans tried to regain that ability Opening phase of 1942 summer offensive Case Blau saw Wehrmacht once again advancing rapidly shocking Soviets Same with 1943 Kursk offensive where Germns tried once again to regain mobility breaking into Soviet rear area and mauling assembled forces Opening phases of these two offensive show that there was nothing inherently wrong with german doctrine what doomed them were other factors These two cases should be included as well because they showed Germans stuck to their doctrine and also why this doctrine failed in the end It failed becasue Soviets were able to deny Germans their mobility first in the ruins of Stalingrad which also hampered combined arms close air and artillery support was less effective because of close proximity of forces then next year by throwing so many obstacles in front of Germans they simply ran out of steam But even so Kharkov counteroffensive Manstein t counterstroke showed that when Germans held the mobility edge and acted agressively they could come on topSecond is that Citino doesn t or refuses to see a direct heir of German approach Israel After it was created Israel followed German principles to the letter that is 1948 49 war does not fall into this cathegory but rest do Short wars start with massive blow battlefield agressivness And you can even see constant German problem that is field commanders acting on their own even without or against orders from higher command Even as late as 1982 Lebanon war Sharon ran his own show hoodwinking Israeli government and outright lying about his intentions Israeli defence minsiter has somewhat different position than in other western contries Even when war opened with Israel on the defensive 1973 battlefield agressiveness was obvious with IDF trying with counter attack right away at Sinai within hours of war s start even when situation was far from clear I can t say if this is due to the fact that Citino focuses so much on German tree that he can t see forrest around it or because he doesn t want to euate anything Israeli with anything German for obvious reasons but omission is telling either way and points to Citino s partial failure at final analysisOverall a decent if somewhat superficial analysis I d recomend it as a way to auire understanding of basic currents of German war making doctrine thinking and performance and applying them when studying either past conflict in detail As I said Citiono identifies what makes German Way of War so special but then fails to apply those elements wider Palestrina and Other Plays richer states2 Operational and strategic mobility of armies While Citino concentrates on operational level that is moving your army on the battlefield to hit enemy in flanks or Blackmailed By Daddy rear strategic mobility is important as well as Frederick the Great proved when he moved his armies all over the place3 When in doubt attack Commanders have to be agressive their task is to find enemy and destroy it Commanders have a strong degree of autonomy specially important later when armies became too big to be commanded by a single person and often operated divided into several parts with spotty and slow communication between themCitino then looks at German military history to prove his points Star performer is of course Frederick the Great specially during 7 years war War which ironically was not short violating 1 principle He proves that Frederick acted agressively and used mobility to full extent gaining upper hand Napoleonic wars and wars of german unification are given same tretment pointing out where principles were applied and how it lead to successCitino tries to answer why Germany failed in WW1 answer being agressiveness was lacking at key moments at key points which led to loss of mobility trench warfare and long attritional war which Germany was doomed to loose 1 principleOne could accuse Citino of cherry picking evidence eg Second Silesian war is given only a passing mention however he tries to explain defeats Jena Ausrstadt opening phase of WW1 west as failing to follow the 3 principles My biggest problem is with conclusion mostly two key pointsFirst Citino ends his analysis with German failure at the gates of Moscow in december 1941 On one hand he makes a case that post WW1 German development उरलं सुरलं [Urla Surla] rested on Cock Tales regaining mobility on strategicoperational level Motorization combined arms doctrine and better communications allowed Germans to advance Son of the Hero rapidly outpacing less motorized enemies and unhinge them something with which I agree However failure at Moscow was not a failure of such concept it was problem of distance tenacity of Red Army massive mobilization capability of Soviet Union weather etc However in next 2 years Germans tried to The Alien Jigsaw regain that ability Opening phase of 1942 summer offensive Case Blau saw Wehrmacht once again advancing Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Human Learning rapidly shocking Soviets Same with 1943 Kursk offensive where Germns tried once again to The Illusion of Gods Presence regain mobility breaking into Soviet Folk Tales From The Soviet Union rear area and mauling assembled forces Opening phases of these two offensive show that there was nothing inherently wrong with german doctrine what doomed them were other factors These two cases should be included as well because they showed Germans stuck to their doctrine and also why this doctrine failed in the end It failed becasue Soviets were able to deny Germans their mobility first in the Not The Hot Chick ruins of Stalingrad which also hampered combined arms close air and artillery support was less effective because of close proximity of forces then next year by throwing so many obstacles in front of Germans they simply Pegged and Plugged at the Club ran out of steam But even so Kharkov counteroffensive Manstein t counterstroke showed that when Germans held the mobility edge and acted agressively they could come on topSecond is that Citino doesn t or Tunnel Through Time refuses to see a direct heir of German approach Israel After it was created Israel followed German principles to the letter that is 1948 49 war does not fall into this cathegory but Game of Bimbofication, Part 3 rest do Short wars start with massive blow battlefield agressivness And you can even see constant German problem that is field commanders acting on their own even without or against orders from higher command Even as late as 1982 Lebanon war Sharon Game of Bimbofication, Part 2 ran his own show hoodwinking Israeli government and outright lying about his intentions Israeli defence minsiter has somewhat different position than in other western contries Even when war opened with Israel on the defensive 1973 battlefield agressiveness was obvious with IDF trying with counter attack Sermons Preached Upon Several Occasions, Vol. 1 of 5 right away at Sinai within hours of war s start even when situation was far from clear I can t say if this is due to the fact that Citino focuses so much on German tree that he can t see forrest around it or because he doesn t want to euate anything Israeli with anything German for obvious The Fatima Century reasons but omission is telling either way and points to Citino s partial failure at final analysisOverall a decent if somewhat superficial analysis I d Leah Starrs Revenge recomend it as a way to auire understanding of basic currents of German war making doctrine thinking and performance and applying them when studying either past conflict in detail As I said Citiono identifies what makes German Way of War so special but then fails to apply those elements wider

free download Ô eBook or Kindle ePUB ã Robert M. Citino

Ores the role played by the Prussian army in elevating a small vulnerable state to the ranks of the European powers describes how nineteenth century victories over Austria and France made the German army the most respected in Europe and reviews the lessons learned from the trenches of World War. A little too selective in its choice of battles and ridiculously blinkered in its definition of German